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Did The Founding Fathers Do “A Heckuva Job”?
Constitutional Authorization for the Use of Federal Troops to Prevent the
Loss of a Major American City
Michael Greenberger1
“Brownie, you’re doing a heckuva job.”2
President Bush’s compliment to FEMA’s Michael Brown on September 2, 2005

Introduction
As the one year anniversary of the landfall of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast
passed, the highly critical reports of the Bush Administration’s mismanagement of the response
to that catastrophe continued to mount.3 Indeed, while the difficulties with the Administration’s
mired military venture in Iraq has been viewed as central to the President’s present record low
approval ratings and the Democratic takeover of both Houses of Congress in the 2006 midterm
elections,4 there can be little doubt that the initial misstep leading to the President’s and the
Republican Party’s fall from grace was the mishandling of, and haunting human suffering from,
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the Katrina affair, an event repeatedly drummed into the American psyche by non-stop newscasts
in late August and early September 2005.
There is, however, a high irony in the Katrina failure. Central to the criticism of the Bush
Administration was its multi-day indecisiveness after the Hurricane made landfall about whether
to deploy the overwhelming military assets of the Federal government to rescue and protect Gulf
Coast citizens overwhelmed by one of the country’s worst natural disasters.5 As will be shown
in greater detail below,6 the President failed to act decisively at that time because of a perceived
lack of Constitutional authority to override Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco’s
refusal to allow the Federal government to have ultimate control over the deployment of those
troops and related Federal assets.
Karl Rove, the then White House Deputy Chief of Staff, is reported to have said, “[t]he
only mistake we made with Katrina was not overriding the local government.”7 Yet, it is
noteworthy that this Constitutional uncertainty emanated from the very same Administration
which has, as its most prominent hallmark, made breathtaking claims of broad inherent
Presidential authority to act unilaterally in the War on Terror.8
Indeed, in a telling criticism of the lack of support from the Federal government,
including the military, Michael Brown, testifying before a Senate committee, noted that if it had
been “confirmed that a terrorist ha[d] blown up the 17th Street Canal levee, then everybody
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would have jumped all over that and been trying to do everything they could.”9 However,
because the event was a natural phenomenon, the Bush Administration’s first instinct was to
follow the usual template for response to natural disasters, i.e., to rely on the States and cities
involved to take the lead, and, in the event of inadequacies at those levels of governments, to
take over the governmental response only if invited to do so.10
Confronted with the prospect of effectively losing a major American city to a hurricane,
what was the basis for this surprising and deadly hesitation by the Executive Branch? Most of
the Bush Administration’s claims of broad executive power concerning the War on Terror are
premised on the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which, in turn, contemplates war efforts.11 Again,
because there was no attack or invasion causing the Katrina disruptions, the sturdy foundation of
Article II’s war powers was almost certainly viewed as an unavailable rationale to the
Administration. Moreover, confronted with Governor Blanco’s refusal to turn over authority for
the Hurricane response to the military, worries about unilateral action infringing on State
sovereignty, especially the Police Power prerogatives of the State, had to be paramount in the
eyes of the Administration. The Rehnquist Court’s rulings contracting the Commerce Clause
beginning in 1995,12 as well as its related expansion of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,13 must
have inspired a natural reflex of legal hesitancy for purposes of Federal intervention with Federal
troops14 when confronted with State resistance to a Federal takeover.
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Indeed, the indecision surrounding the use of Federal troops was doubtless aggravated by
the paralyzing effect of a single Reconstruction era Federal statute: the Posse Comitatus Act
(“PCA”). That statute provides that “except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,” Federal troops may not be used for domestic
law enforcement.15 As is shown below, the Bush Administration by the end of 2004 had already
worked out and publicly announced that the bar within the PCA would not prevent it from using
Federal troops to respond to a massive natural disaster such as Katrina.16 Yet, that resolution
somehow was mystifyingly forgotten after Katrina hit. Federal lawyers pondered for days after
landfall whether there were exceptions to the PCA that would allow introduction of Federal
troops.17
On October 17, 2006, however, all doubt about the President’s authority to use Federal
troops to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster, even over the objection of the affected State,
was resolved. That day the President signed into law the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.18 A key provision within this legislation (“the Warner
Amendment”) amends the Insurrection Act to allow the President unilaterally, i.e., without the
consent of the States involved, to deploy Federal troops, to respond to natural disasters and other
major domestic emergencies.19 The amendment, therefore, creates the kind of statutory
exception recognized as trumping the military prohibition within the PCA. The Warner

15

18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
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N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
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See, e.g., Libby George and John M. Donnelly, HR 5122 – Fiscal 2007 Defense Authorization, CQ BILL
ANALYSIS, Oct. 19, 2006; John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Ch. 15, sec. 1042,
§ 333, Pub. L. No. 109-364 (2006).
19
Id.; see also George Cahlink, Governors ‘Disappointed’ With Expanding Federal Role of National Guard, CQ
TODAY, Oct. 6, 2006.
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Amendment became law over the bi-partisan objection of all State Governors, who claimed it
trampled upon State sovereignty.20
The question remains, however, whether there is a Constitutional justification for the
Warner Amendment, especially in situations where the State in question is resisting Federal
control of the disaster response with Federal troops. It is the thesis of this article that
Constitutional justifications for the Warner Amendment can be found within the relatively
obscure Insurrection and Guarantee Clauses of the Constitution, as well as a careful reading of
even those Commerce Clause cases which have given the greatest deference to State sovereignty.
Moreover, as we show below,21 Justice Scalia has recently emphasized the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a supporting foundation for Congressional reliance on the aforementioned Clauses.
If, however, there is uncertainty about these Constitutional justifications, it is argued
below that Congress could remove all Constitutional doubt on this question by conditioning the
considerable Federal aid that is given States to respond to severe natural disasters on the ability
of the President to determine that Federal troops must be in control where the President finds, as
was the case in Katrina, that the State is incapable of taking charge of the response.22
As will also be shown below,23 the extraordinary power contemplated by the Warner
Amendment must be understood in context. The legislative history of the Amendment, as well
as repeated Executive Branch doctrine, makes it clear that the conventional expectation will be
that States and localities will control responses to natural disasters, even severe ones. In those
instances, the Federal government will supplement, not take over, State and local resources.
20
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of National Guard, U.S. STATE NEWS, Sept. 20, 2006 [hereinafter Napolitano]; see also Press Release, Office of
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However, in those rare instances where the State and localities are unable to respond, as was true
in Katrina, the Constitution, in Justice Jackson’s apt phrase, should not be turned “into a suicide
pact.”24 In those dire instances, where the State cannot act, the Federal government has not only
the authority, but, indeed, the Constitutional duty to lead the response.
To place these points in context, it will be helpful first to review the magnitude of the
Katrina disaster both in terms of the human suffering it caused and of the inability of Louisiana
and New Orleans to mount a response.25 Second, not only must the impact of the PCA be
reviewed, but also consideration will be given below to the widespread and inaccurate myths that
surround that statute, thereby causing a reflexive and unnecessary hesitation to use Federal
troops when States are overwhelmed.26 Third, the Warner Amendment will be addressed,
including the Congressional emphasis that, only in circumstances such as Katrina where States
and localities are overwhelmed, will Federal troops lead the response.27 Finally, the
Constitutional underpinning of the Warner Amendment will be addressed, especially in light of
the fact that all of the Nation’s Governors have viewed it as an infringement on State
Constitutional prerogatives.28

Hurricane Katrina and the Absence of Government
It is now universally recognized that Hurricane Katrina was an unprecedented disaster
that virtually destroyed a major U.S. city. During the days following its landfall, chaos reigned
in the Gulf Coast region, particularly in New Orleans. In Louisiana, State and local governments
were incapable of acting in areas affected by the hurricane, and desperation grew as the public
24

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the decision of the Court,
in its broad interpretation of the First Amendment, was effectively choosing “anarchy” over “liberty with order,”
thus “convert[ing] the constitutional Bill of rights into a suicide pact.”).
25
See infra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 80-82, 105-107 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 140-166 and accompanying text.
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sector “seemed unable to meet its basic compact with its citizens.”29 Evacuations were ordered
that could not be executed.30 Basic civil services were nil: the power was out, the roads were not
navigable, communication was all but nonexistent,31 fires burned untended,32 and rescue efforts
were “a fugue of improvisation.”33 In short, the sheer magnitude of the catastrophe effectively
shut down the State and local government insofar as New Orleans was concerned.
Hurricane Katrina impacted almost 93,000 square miles across 138 parishes and
counties.34 Its official death toll is 1,697.35 It is estimated that property damage as a result of
Katrina is approaching the $100 billion mark, making Katrina the most costly disaster in U.S.
history.36 In addition to Katrina’s fatalities, about 770,000 people were displaced from their
homes.37 Even a year after Katrina, most public schools are still closed, hospitals are crippled,
the court system is dysfunctional, and power outages are a regular event.38
In its immediate aftermath, the destruction sent thousands of victims across State borders
in search of food and shelter and required delivery of relief workers and supplies from across the
Nation.39 Major national industries were closed or their operations dramatically cut back.40 The
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2005 at A1.
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Id.
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Id.
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TRIB., Sept. 4, 2006, at 1.
33
Glasser, supra note 29.
34
TOWNSEND, supra note 3, at 5.
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Largest Relief U.S. Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A1 (illustrating evacuation attempts for the city of
New Orleans as well as New Orleans’s Mayor C. Ray Nagin’s fear that the hurricane might have killed thousands in
his city).
40 See, e.g., Prices for Energy Futures Soar in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at C2,
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hurricane severely impaired substantial portions of the country’s oil refineries and curtailed
offshore production of oil and gas.41 As a result, the Nation experienced a sharp and immediate
spike in gasoline prices.42
In the absence of a State and local governmental presence, lawlessness consumed the city
of New Orleans. It was widely reported that:
•

“Looting was widespread, sometimes in full view of outnumbered police and often
unarmed [Louisiana] National Guard troops;”43

•

“[R]apes were reported in the Convention Center, where some officers were beaten
by an angry crowd;”44

•

“[R]eports of carjackings, shootings, lootings and rapes reached authorities, who
admitted that much of New Orleans ha[d] slipped from their control;”45 and

•

“The police themselves may have helped trigger the lawlessness, as reports that some
of their own had engaged in looting swept through the city.”46

C4:
Economists warned that Katrina was likely to leave a deeper mark on the national economy than
previous hurricanes because of its profound disruption to the Gulf of Mexico’s complex energy
supply network . . . . The airline industry felt the delayed brunt of Hurricane Katrina, with some
airports running low on jet fuel and carriers canceling hundreds more flights.
41 Jad Mouawad & Simon Romero, Gas Prices Surge as Supply Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A1.
42 Some States reached higher gas prices than they had ever experienced pre-Katrina. See Associated Press,
Gasoline Pricing Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 14NJ-6 (“New Jersey’s gasoline prices hit their highest
levels ever on Labor Day, averaging $3.16 a gallon for regular. . . .”); Jad Mouawad, Storm Stretches Refiners Past a
Perilous Point, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 27 (“The hurricane also knocked off a dozen refineries at the peak of
summer demand, sending oil prices higher and gasoline prices to inflation-adjusted records.”); Mouawad & Romero,
supra note 41, at A1 (“While gasoline averaged $2.60 a gallon earlier in the week [of Aug. 29 to Sept. 2], unleaded
regular gas was selling [on Aug. 31] at $3.09 at stations in West Palm Beach, Fla.; $3.49 in Indianapolis; and $3.25
in San Francisco. Premium fuel was going for up to $3.89 a gallon in Chicago.”).
43
Id.
44
Douglas Birch et al., Ruined City Turns Violent; Thousands of Guard Troops Try to Restore Order; In New
Orleans, Looting in Streets, Rapes at Shelter and Bodies on Sidewalks; Katrina’s Wake, BALT. SUN, Sept. 2, 2005,
at 1A.
45
Lee Hancock & Michael Grabell, ‘Desperate SOS’ Amid Hunger, Thirst and Lawlessness, Frustrations Boil Over
in New Orleans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, at 1A.
46
Evan Thomas, The Lost City, NEWSWEEK , Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
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This lawlessness contributed to the sub-human conditions experienced at the New
Orleans Superdome and Convention Center. The following include some descriptions of the
havoc within these structures in which refugees were forced to seek shelter during Katrina:
“horrible prison;” “the darkest hole in the world;” “the place I want to forget;” and “hell.”47 The
Superdome had been designated by New Orleans as a shelter of last resort, never meant to hold
storm refugees for long.48 Nonetheless, it housed about 20,000 people between August 29 and
September 4, 2005.49 Even having designated the Superdome as a shelter of last resort, neither
the State nor the city had plans to stock the facility with food and water.50 Lost power meant no
air conditioning and backed up toilets.51 The stench was so bad that medical workers wore
masks, and thousands of retching people had to be moved outside the dome.52
One advantage that refugees at the Superdome enjoyed, however, was that those entering
that facility had been searched for weapons.53 Such precautions were not taken at the Ernest N.
Morial Convention Center.54 Consequently, violence at the Convention Center exceeded even
that at the Superdome.55 The Convention Center was never intended to hold refugees, even as a
last resort.56 Yet, this structure held 15,000 people during those fateful days.57 Also without
power and swelteringly hot, the situation at the Center was described by Captain Winn, the head

47

Paul Salopek & Deborah Horan, How Places of Refuge Went to Hell, CHIC. TRIB., Sept., 15, 2005, at 1.
Id.
49
Holbrook Mohr et al., Blanco Says Evacuation Buses on the Way to N.O., NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug.
31, 2005, available at http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_TimesPicayune/archives/2005_08_31.html#075326; Salopek, supra note 47; Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path
from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 1.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.; Salopek, supra note 47.
53
Lipton, supra note 49.
54
Id.
55
Id.; Salopek, supra note 47.
56
Id.
57
Id.
48
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of the police SWAT team, as “completely lawless.”58 Gunfire was routine.59 There were several
reports of women being dragged off by groups of men and gang-raped.60 Captain Winn found a
corpse with multiple stab wounds in the building.61 The beleaguered eighty to ninety New
Orleans police officers, already at a severe disadvantage of numbers, could only rush into the
darkness with flashlights after seeing muzzle flashes.62 Even when culprits were caught, no
temporary holding cells had been set up to hold them.63
As early as August 19 (or ten days before Katrina made land fall on the Gulf Coast) , the
Secretary of Defense delegated authority to deploy Department of Defense (“DOD”) assets to the
United States Northern Command (“NORTHCOM”) in anticipation of the hurricane’s arrival on
the Florida Atlantic coast.64 On August 24, NORTHCOM Operations Directorate began
conducting teleconferences between entities such as FEMA, the First and Fifth Armies (the U.S.
Army forces east and west of the Mississippi River, respectively), and the supporting commands
of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.65 On August 30, the day after Katrina made landfall,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed NORTHCOM’s Commander that he had a “blank
check” for DOD resources he believed were necessary for the response effort.66
The evening of Monday, August 29, the day of Katrina’s landfall in Louisiana, Governor
Blanco made her now infamous plea for President Bush to send “everything you have got.”67
Over the next two days, Governor Blanco specified her request by asking for troops from the

58

Lipton, supra note 49.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Salopek, supra note 47.
62
Lipton, supra note 49.
63
Id.
64
S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED 26-13 (May 2006),
available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf.
65
Id. at 26-15.
66
Id. at 26-12.
67
Id. at 26-30.
59
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President at least two more times, one time asking for 40,000 Federal troops.68 President Bush
promised 7,200 Federal troops on Saturday, five days after landfall.69 Although Governor
Blanco “wouldn’t have turned down federal troops,” she did not want a Federal takeover of the
disaster relief effort.70 She wished to retain primary reliance on State National Guard troops,
while using Federal troops under Louisiana control for traditional disaster relief tasks that do not
amount to law enforcement.71 Yet, given the state of chaos in the Gulf Coast, Pentagon and
military officials were hesitant to send in Federal troops under Governor Blanco’s control,
especially if those troops did not have law enforcement authority.72
Both President Bush and White House Chief of Staff Card pressed Governor Blanco to
request a Federal takeover of the relief effort so that Federal troops could be deployed to restore
law and order.73 Governor Blanco balked at the suggestion, concerned that it was tantamount to
a Federal declaration of martial law.74 The Bush administration then sent Governor Blanco a
proposed legal memorandum asking her to request a Federal takeover, which she rejected.75 She
also rejected a more modest proposal for a hybrid command structure, under which a three-star
general who had been sworn into the Louisiana National Guard would command all troops –
both State and federalized National Guard and armed services troops.76

68

Id. at 26-46.
Id.
70
Glasser, supra note 29.
71
S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 64, at 26-48. Some typical disaster relief tasks that do not amount to
law enforcement include “search and rescue, clearing roads, delivering supplies, and providing medical assistance.”
Steve Bowman et al., Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT
RL33095, Sept. 19, 2005, at CRS-7 n. 21, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf.
72
Eric Lipton et al., Why Troops Weren’t Sent Right Away, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
73
Glasser, supra note 29.
74
Manuel Roig-Franzia and Spencer Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still Waiting, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090301680.html; Glasser, supra note 29.
75
Roig-Franzia, supra note 74.
76
See Lipton, supra note 17.
69
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These appeasing measures at that stage of crisis were thought to be necessary because the
Bush administration then believed that the PCA barred deployment of troops to restore order.
The investigation into the legality of invoking the Insurrection Act, an exception to the PCA that
would allow Federal troops to enforce civil law, led to “a flurry of meetings at the Justice
Department, the White House and other agencies,”77 and erupted into “a fierce debate.”78 The
White House instructed the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) to resolve the
issue. The OLC finally “concluded the federal government had authority to move in even over
the objection of local officials.”79

The Posse Comitatus Act
As the discussion above demonstrates, the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”) has been a
jurisprudential force to be reckoned with concerning introduction of Federal troops for the
purposes of enforcing law. “[E]xcept in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress,” the PCA prohibits using the Federal troops for this
purpose.80 Enacted in 1878, the PCA was a response to the imposition of Federal martial law
upon the former Confederate States to maintain civil order.81 Congress was concerned that this
use of the U.S. military caused that institution to become increasingly politicized and to stray
from its traditional non-civilian function.82 However, Congress also clearly recognized that, by
virtue of Constitutional authority or statutory authorization, exceptions to the general bar would
be required in extraordinary circumstances to preserve law and order.

77

Id.
Glasser, supra note 29.
79
See Lipton, supra note 17; see also Glasser, supra note 29.
80
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
81
Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth of Posse Comitatus, J. HOMELAND SEC., Oct. 2000, at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/articles/trebilcock.htm.
82
Id.
78
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In the context of this discussion, it is important to understand the distinctions between the
active armed forces and the National Guard. Members of the armed forces are in the active
military service of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.83 With the
exception of the Coast Guard, members of the armed forces are constrained by the PCA.84 As
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the U.S. Constitution grants the President control of
the operation of the armed forces.85
Members of the National Guard simultaneously are members of their respective State
militias and the Army Federal reserve.86 The National Guard traditionally operates under the
control of the State and territorial Governors.87 In this State capacity, members of the National
Guard are not constrained by the PCA and may perform civilian law enforcement functions.88
However, National Guard personnel may be called into Federal service (or “federalized”) by the
President.89 While under Federal status, National Guard members may perform typical disaster
relief tasks (such as search and rescue, clearing roads, delivering supplies, and providing medical
assistance), but, when federalized, members of the Guard are subject to the PCA, and they may
not perform law enforcement functions unless pursuant to a PCA exception.90
On April 17, 2002, President Bush authorized the establishment of the NORTHCOM to
provide command and control of DOD defense efforts and coordinate defense support of civil

83

10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (1998 & Supp. 2006).
Linda J. Dermaine & Brian Rosen, Process Dangers of Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement:
Rectifying the Posse Comitatus Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 174-78 (2006).
85
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
86
See Bowman, supra note 71, at CRS-6-7.
87
Id. at CRS-7.
88
Id. National Guard personnel may also have “Title 32” (32 U.S.C. 502(f) (2000)) status, meaning they are still
under control of their governor, but receive federal pay and benefits. Bowman, supra note 71, at CRS-8. National
Guard personnel under Title 32 status are not constrained by the PCA. Id.; see also U.S. Northern Command, The
Posse Comitatus Act, http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/posse_comitatus.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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authorities within the United States.91 NORTHCOM’s assigned area of responsibility includes
air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada,
Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.92 NORTHCOM
assumed its official responsibilities on October 1, 2002.93 The creation of NORTHCOM was the
first time since the Civil War that the U.S. Armed Forces had operational command for domestic
purposes.94
We discuss in detail below the statutory provisions that had, even prior to Katrina, been
recognized as constituting the express Congressional exceptions contemplated by the PCA,
thereby almost certainly authorizing the very action the Bush Administration equivocated over
for days before OLC finally and belatedly weighed in blessing the introduction of Federal troops
and assets within Louisiana.95 The confusion over the scope of the PCA after Katrina’s onset is
even more astounding, because in December 2004, thirty-two Federal officials, under the
leadership of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), promulgated the National
Response Plan (“NRP”) designed to provide federally directed coordination of responses to
natural and manmade disasters amounting to “Incidents of National Significance.”96 The NRP
expressly provides that facing “imminently serious conditions,” the military may be called upon
to take any and all action necessary “to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property
damage.” Neither the White House, DHS, nor the remaining thirty-one agencies who signed on
to the NRP realized in late August and early September 2005 that, as of December 2004, the
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U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Northern Command, http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm,
http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/history.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
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Id.
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Id.
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Laura K. Donohue, Home Front Becomes Military Target, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2006.
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See infra notes 108-129 and accompanying text.
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See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN v-viii, 4 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_FullText.pdf.
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Federal government was expressly on record as authorizing the kind of Federal leadership that
was so disastrously delayed after Katrina’s landfall.
Even more confounding is that, even after OLC recognized that PCA did not pose a bar
to Federal action even in the face of State opposition, the leadership of the Justice Department
and DOD nevertheless urged President Bush not to take command of the relief effort due to fears
that Governor Blanco would refuse surrendering control, thereby causing a political backlash.97
One senior administration official, speaking anonymously, questioned,
[c]an you imagine how it would have been perceived if a president of the United
States of one party had pre-emptively taken from the female governor of another
party the command and control of her forces, unless the security situation made it
completely clear that she was unable to effectively execute her command
authority and that lawlessness was the inevitable result?98
One only has to ask what the “political” response would have been throughout the Nation if the
President had immediately deployed the military and all Federal resources to rescue, for
example, those trapped in the Superdome and the Convention Center or those many elderly
patients trapped by the flooding in hospitals and elder care facilities. It does not take us too far
afield to speculate that had the President so acted, even in the face of Governor Blanco’s
opposition, the public response to the Federal handling of Katrina would have been
enthusiastically supportive.
Ultimately (but belatedly), on “ September 7, DOD assets in the affected area included
42,990 National Guard personnel, 17,417 active duty personnel, 20 U.S. ships, 360 helicopters,
and 93 fixed wing aircraft.”99 A week and a half after the hurricane made landfall, 50,000
National Guard troops and 22,000 active duty troops were on the ground in the Gulf Coast
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Lipton, supra note 17.
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region, constituting the largest deployment of troops within the United States since the Civil
War.100
On September 15, 2005 in his speech at Jackson Square in New Orleans, President Bush
stated, “[i]t is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater Federal authority and a
broader role for the armed forces . . . .”101 Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2005, Governors
Michael Huckabee (D-Ark.) and Janet Napolitano (D-Ariz.), then Chair and Vice Chair of the
National Governors Association, respectively, directly contradicted President Bush’s sentiment,
stating “[s]tate and local governments are in the best position to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from disaster and emergency.”102

Traditional Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act
Even before the Warner Amendment’s October 17, 2006 enactment unmistakably
authorized the use of Federal troops in these circumstances, there was an abundance of authority,
as the NRP expressly stated in December 2004, that, when confronted with overwhelmed State
and local entities in a disaster of nationwide consequence, the Federal government may deploy
Federal troops to lead the response to the incident even in the face of State and local opposition.
In so stating, it bears repeating that, when, as is usually true, the State and local governments are
capable of mounting a response and maintaining law and order, State and local institutions
should, both as a matter of law and policy, retain the lead role.103 In those instances, the Federal
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S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 64, at 26-1.
Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation (Sept. 15, 2005),
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government, where properly requested, should supplement, not take over, the State and local
command structure. Given the size of Katrina, however, the only level of government with the
assets to handle the incident was the Federal government, acting through, inter alia, military
deployments. Katrina and disasters of that magnitude present “security situation[s that] ma[k]e it
completely clear that [States are] unable to effectively execute . . . command authority and that
lawlessness [is] the inevitable result.”104
To be sure, prior the Warner Amendment, the PCA had been viewed in many quarters as
being “riddled with uncertainty and complexity.”105 Much of this uncertainty arose because lay
observers, especially military commanders and first responders at all levels of government,
focused almost exclusively on the prohibition within the PCA, while simply overlooking the fact
that there may be statutory or Constitutional exceptions that the statute would recognize.106
Confusion has also often arisen as to which exceptions apply, when they apply, and what their
scope is.107 This paper discusses two critically important PCA exceptions – the Insurrection Act
and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which pre-date the passage of the Warner Amendment
and are the basis of the scholarship underpinning the NRP’s recognition that Federal troops may
be deployed in response to a natural catastrophe in the face of overwhelmed State capacity.
The Insurrection Act
Even prior to the Warner Amendment’s clarification, the Insurrection Act permitted the
use of Federal troops to enforce civilian laws in response to insurrections and similar types of
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civil disturbance.108 For example, in 1992, President H.W. Bush used Federal troops to quell the
Los Angeles riots upon the request of California’s Governor pursuant to the Insurrection Act’s
first provision that states:109
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the
legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed
forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.110
While this provision requires the request of a Governor or State legislature, the next two
provisions of that statute do not. For example, section 332 states:
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia
of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to
enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.111
Thus, section 332 permits the President to decide unilaterally to deploy Federal troops, even in
the absence of State request, to restore the ability to enforce Federal law. Under an early version
of this provision, President Washington, in 1794, used the military to suppress the Whiskey
Rebellion in Pennsylvania to enforce a Federal excise tax on liquor even without the active
support of that State’s Governor.112
Moreover, Section 333 of the Insurrection Act provides:
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other
means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State,
any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it-108

Id., at 193-94.
See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, Comment: Insurrection, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/content/articles/050926ta_talk_lemann.
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10 U.S.C. § 331 (1998).
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See, e.g., The Papers of George Washington Documents, The Whiskey Insurrection, available at
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(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States
within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right,
privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law,
and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect
that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes
the course of justice under those laws.113
This provision therefore permits the President to use Federal troops, even in the absence of State
request, to ensure citizens are provided with the protections of Federal Constitutional or statutory
law when the “constituted authorities of that State are unable” to enforce State and/or Federal
law. Under this provision, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, in 1957 and 1963 respectively,
determined unilaterally to send troops into the Southern States to enforce Constitutionally
protected civil rights through desegregation.114
Thus, even before the recent passage of the Warner Amendment, sections 332 and/or 333
of the Insurrection Act were deemed to be important exceptions to the PCA, permitting the
President to use Federal troops to restore law and order when State governments were neither
able nor desirous of doing so.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HAS”)115 was signed into law on November 25,
2002.116 This sweeping legislation created the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
whose duties were to “analyze threats, [] guard our borders and airports, protect our critical
infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our nation for future emergencies.”117 Under Title
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10 U.S.C. § 333 (1998).
See, e.g., Lemann, supra note 109.
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V of the HSA, entitled “Emergency Preparedness and Response,” the Act broadly defines the
roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response, as including “helping to ensure the
effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies;” “managing . . . the Federal government’s response to terrorist attacks and major
disasters;” “aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;” “building a
comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local government
personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters;” and “consolidating
existing Federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national
response plan.”118
In response to the HSA, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
(“HSPD-5”),119 assigning the DHS Secretary the responsibility of developing a National Incident
Management System (“NIMS”) to provide a “nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to and recover
from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”120 HSPD-5 also implemented
HSA’s mandate that “a coordinated national response plan,” i.e., the NRP, be developed to
“integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans
into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.”121
Under the authority of the HSA and HSPD-5, the NRP122 commits every signatory to it,
including (but not limited to) each member of the Federal executive Cabinet, to “[s]upport[] NRP
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Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb. 28, 2003), available at
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120
Id. at (15).
121
Id. at (16).
122
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 96.
119

21

Working Draft December 1, 2006
concepts, processes, and structures and carrying out their assigned functional responsibilities to
ensure effective and efficient incident management . . . .”123
The NRP is activated when the DHS Secretary declares an incident to be an “Incident of
National Significance.”124 It further defines catastrophic events as the most severe Incidents of
National Significance:
A catastrophic event is [an] . . . incident . . . that results in extraordinary levels of
mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population,
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government
functions . . . result[ing] in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of
time; almost immediately exceed[ing] resources normally available to State,
local, tribal and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly
interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that
national security could be threatened . . . .125
In an event that “exceeds resources normally available to State [and] local . . .
authorities,” “[t]he primary mission is to save lives; protect critical infrastructure, property, and
the environment; contain the event; and preserve national security.”126 In addition, “[s]tandard
procedures regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances,
suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of catastrophic magnitude,”127 and any
“coordination process[es] must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and use of critical
resources.”128 Recognizing that the NRP, as derived from the HSA and HSPD-5, mandates
“immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property damage,” the plan
provides that, when facing
[i]mminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency . . . and time
does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders
and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by
123
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DOD directive and pre-approval by the Secretary of Defense, subject to any
supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take
necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with the
Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385). All such necessary action is referred to
as “Immediate Response.”129
In sum, the NRP contemplated that there would not always be adequate time to deploy the active
military and that “DOD components and agencies are authorized [in advance] to take necessary
action” or “[i]mmediate [r]esponse” to quell the emergency. Therefore, “subject to any [DOD]
supplemental direction that may be provided,” Federal troop deployment orders are “preapprov[ed]” under the NRP. To be sure, that response must be at the “request of civil
authorities,” but, because the NRP coordinates all levels of government and imposes response
obligations on dozens of civil Federal agencies, it is clear that the “request” could be from the
Federal, and not necessarily State or local, civil authorities.
In light of the HSA (and HSPD-5, and the NRP which derive from it), the deep and
widespread lawlessness that occurred in New Orleans during Katrina would have justified the
President in using the military to aid law enforcement to save lives and contain the event.

The Recent Clarifying Warner Amendment
Of course, the recent passage of the Warner Amendment removes all doubt about the
President’s statutory authority to decide unilaterally to use Federal troops to respond to a massive
disaster such as that experienced as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Following Katrina there were
a series of Congressional and White House reports, each of which made it clear that the President
must use Federal troops to prevent and respond to natural disasters of this kind. During the
Warner Amendment’s consideration, the Senate Committee on Armed Services pointed to “the
lack of explicit [statutory] references to such situations as natural disasters or terrorist attacks

129
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[that] may have contributed to a reluctance to use the armed forces in situations such as
Hurricane Katrina.”130 The House Committee on Armed Services similarly noted “that there are
a number of areas where [DOD] could have improved the execution of military support during
Hurricane Katrina.”131 These Congressional sentiments echoed White House concerns expressed
in its Lessons Learned, which recommended that, in the future, DHS and DOD “should jointly
plan for [DOD’s] support of Federal response activities as well as those extraordinary
circumstances when it is appropriate for the [DOD] to lead the Federal response.”132
In response to these broad based concerns, Congress amended the Insurrection Act to
make it clear that the President, when he determines during, inter alia, a “natural disaster,
epidemic, or other serious pubic health emergency . . . [that] the constituted authorities of the
State . . . are incapable of maintaining public order,” he may “employ the armed forces,
including the National Guard in Federal service.”133
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S. REP. NO. 109-254 (2006) (Title X, subtitle E, § 1042).
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The Constitutional Underpinnings of the Warner Amendment
Federal vs. State Power
All fifty Governors opposed the Warner Amendment.134 In August 2006, the National
Governors Association, led by its Chair, Governor Janet Napolitano (D-Ariz.), sent a series of
letters to lawmakers and to then Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, asking for removal of the
“federalization” amendment from the Defense Authorization Act within which it was
included.135 Governor Napolitano argued that Congress’ “proposals represent[] a dramatic
expansion of Federal authority during natural disasters that could cause confusion in the
command-and-control of the National Guard and interfere with States’ ability to respond to
natural disasters within their borders.”136 Governor Mike Huckabee (R-Ark.) complained that
the “provision was drafted without consultation or input from governors and represents an
unprecedented shift in authority from governors as Commanders and Chief of the Guard to the
Federal government.”137
However, this criticism overlooks the principal controlling caveat within the amendment.
It is not triggered until the President makes a finding, as clearly could have been made in
Katrina, that the States are “unable” to respond to the disaster. As has been historically true,
even serious natural disasters will normally stay within the control of the States when they
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maintain the ability to sustain or restore order. This is reflected in the default rule within the
NRP, i.e., that disasters should be dealt with at the lowest level of government possible. Stated
most pointedly, this measure does not interfere with State sovereignty because it is only triggered
with there is no sovereignty within the State.
Moreover, in the “real” world, or, perhaps put more accurately in light of Katrina, in a
less dysfunctional environment, adroit handling of these crises by Federal officials may eliminate
any conflict between the State and the Federal governments even in situations where the State
has difficulty handling the disaster. The NRP contemplates a coordinated, constant, and real
time response among all levels of government.138 If Federal leadership is operating in a unified
collective fashion (which did not happen in response to Katrina), it should be in real time and
constant communications with State and local leadership concerning the management of the
disaster (which also did not happen). As problems arise, the Federal government may skillfully
be able to offer Federal assistance under the guise of supplementing the State response without
having to embark on the formality of officially declaring a Federal takeover with Federal troops.
One can well imagine that at least a part of the Governors’ objection to the Warner
Amendment is the horrifying and humiliating prospect of being formally and publicly told by the
Federal government to step aside in the midst of a disaster. Despite the mandates of the NRP,
the responsible Federal officials not only did not regularly meet collectively during Katrina; they
never met. Moreover, they only communicated with Louisiana and New Orleans in a sporadic
and haphazard manner.139 This haphazard management style (which defies the basic principles
underlying emergency response to catastrophes) allowed the New Orleans situation to spin out of
control quickly, thereby necessitating the President’s sudden and dramatic insistence that
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Governor Blanco surrender her control. If the spirit of the NRP is followed and if the crisis is
managed on a real time basis with continuous communication, only in a worst-case scenario
would the Federal government find it necessary to direct and supervise the relief effort officially.
In any event, the Constitution not only authorizes Congress to maintain order during a
catastrophe of national significance when the States are incapable of doing so, it requires it. Four
Constitutional provisions provide Congress with this authority and responsibility: the
Insurrection, Guarantee, Commerce, and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.
The Insurrection and Guarantee Clauses.
The Founding Fathers had an abiding interest in ensuring the safety and the democratic
stability of the State governments. At the time of the founding, not only were many States
surrounded by hostile external forces, but many residents within the States were resistant to
abiding by State and Federal law, especially concerning the collection of taxes.140 One of the
key events stoking this concern on the part of the Constitutional drafters was the January 1787
Shays’ Rebellion, during which Daniel Shays, a former officer in the Continental Army, led a
farmers’ insurrection against high taxes levied by Massachusetts to pay its Revolutionary War
debts.141 Shays’ insurgents seized a Federal arsenal in Springfield, which led to a violent and
deadly skirmish with a private militia force financed by wealthy Boston creditors. Massachusetts
ultimately quelled the insurrection. However, events such as these pointed out the fragility of
State institutions, including the uncertainty of upholding laws within those jurisdictions.142
As a result of this concern, two provisions of relevance here were included within the
Constitution to ensure that the Federal government, inter alia, had an obligation to maintain the
140
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governmental integrity of, and enforce Federal law within, the States. The Insurrection Clause
affords Congress the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”143 The Guarantee Clause provides that the
“United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . .”144 Again, these provision did not merely grant authority for the Federal
government to act; they imposed an affirmative obligation on it. Moreover, the plain language
and historical reliance on these Clauses makes clear that, where, because of public disorder, the
guarantees of Federal law are in jeopardy or the democratic structure of State government is in
peril, the Federal government must fulfill its Constitutional duty even if uninvited by the State to
do so.
These two provisions form the Constitutional basis for the Insurrection Act, the first
version of which was passed in 1792. As noted above, that Act, in its various incarnations,
authorized the deployment of Federal troops or State militia under Federal control to quell: the
Whiskey Rebellion; disorders in the South enforcing Federal desegregation orders; and, most
recently, the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles.145 In each of these situations, the affected State
either recognized that it was incapable of maintaining order, or the President unilaterally
determined that was the case and Federal troops were used to maintain the peace.
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As discussed above, the complete breakdown of orderly State and local governmental
services within New Orleans during Katrina, and the chaos that ensued, clearly invited use of the
Insurrection Act under the auspices of the Insurrection and Guarantee Clauses insofar as neither
the State nor local governments were able to protect even the most basic civil rights of New
Orleans residents.146 Even prior to the passage of the Warner Amendment, and even in cases
where the States have not invited Federal intervention, there has never been a serious argument
advanced that it is unconstitutional to use Federal troops when the States and localities are
wholly incapable of enforcing law and maintaining order.
The Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses
Finally, as noted above,147 Katrina also imposed a substantial adverse impact on interstate
commerce. Thousands crossed State lines in search of refuge through choked lines of egress.148
Goods and services necessary for survival and safety were brought into the region inconsistently
and in a disorganized manner, or not at all.149 On a nationwide basis, industrial services and
manufacturing were cut back or terminated. The price of commodities soared throughout the
Nation, most noticeably the price of gasoline.
To the extent the Warner Amendment affords the President the right to unilaterally insert
Federal troops to restore order within an area devastated by a catastrophic event, that action
should also be justified as appropriate under the Commerce Clause,150 as it almost certainly
mitigates the substantial adverse impact on interstate commerce.
While some respected public health law academics have argued that recent Commerce
Clause jurisprudence substantially limits Congressional intrusion on the States’ Constitutional
146
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See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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Police Powers affecting the health of its citizens,151 even the arguably stricter Commerce Clause
tests would support the use of the Warner Amendment to deal with incidents such as Katrina. In
that vein, there can be no doubt that statute could properly be used to “regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.”152
Moreover, in Pierce County v. Guillen,153 the Court upheld a Federal statute barring
disclosure in State courts of federally required road safety studies by emphasizing that these
studies protect “the channels of interstate commerce . . .”154 It is certainly the case that
introduction of Federal troops in a Katrina-like catastrophe has as its principle mission to open
up “the channels of interstate commerce,” thereby bringing the Warner Amendment well within
Guillen-like Commerce Clause doctrine.
Doubts about the scope of the Commerce Clause in this regard should also be reduced by
the recent case of Gonzales v. Raich.155 In Raich, the Supreme Court, on a 6-3 vote, ruled that
Congress, through the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”),156 could regulate entirely intrastate
commerce in the growth, distribution, and sale of marijuana for medicinal purposes, and preempt
State legislation supporting such commerce. It reasoned that the Commerce Clause was properly
invoked, because the production in question contravened the CSA’s objective of “controll[ing]
substance[s] hav[ing] a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of

151

See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitutional Design, 11 HEALTH
MATRIX 265, 289- 91 (2001) (relying, inter alia, on Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549-50); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
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the American people,”157 thus affecting interstate commerce by endangering the Nation’s public
health.158 In so ruling, it rejected the argument that “Congress has encroached on States’
traditional Police Powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of their citizens”159
To be sure, Justice Stevens in Raich, writing for himself and four others, emphasized that
“the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic.”160 It might be argued that,
if the Federal government is relying only on the Commerce Clause (as opposed, for example, on
the Insurrection and Guarantee Clauses), the introduction of Federal troops to restore public
order may go beyond a strictly economic purpose.161
However, Justice Stevens rested his opinion not only on the Commerce Clause, but also
cited the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify the Court’s ruling.162 That reference proved to
be important, because Justice Scalia concurred separately in Raich to make clear he wished to
avoid an isolated “substantial effects” test and instead stressed the importance of the Necessary
and Proper Clause in reaching his result. In so doing, he said: “Congress’s regulatory authority
over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper
Clause.”163 He therefore concluded that even noneconomic activity may be prohibited “as a
necessary part of a larger regulation,”164 and “thus agree[d] with the Court that, however the
class of regulated activities is subdivided, Congress could reasonably conclude that its objective
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of prohibiting marijuana from the interstate market ‘could be undercut’ if those activities were
excepted from its general scheme of regulation.”165
As discussed above, both in the immediate and extended aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
interstate commerce was dramatically imperiled.166 Considering Raich’s confirmation of Federal
authority over State regulation of even purely local activities if they have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, any major domestic catastrophic incident such as Katrina is likely to be
considered a proper use by Congress if its commerce powers are supplemented by the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Indeed, it would be a high irony if a Governor elected by the citizens of a
single State is unable to mount an effective governmental response while simultaneously tying
the hands of the Federal government’s attempt to mitigate hugely damaging commercial impacts
severely affecting the citizens of the other forty-nine States, none of whom have elected the
resisting Governor.
In sum, the force of the Insurrection, Guarantee, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper
Clauses form a sturdy Constitutional foundation to support Presidential action under the Warner
Amendment even in the face of State resistance.
The Spending Clause
As we have noted above,167 Congress, in passing the Warner Amendment, erased any
doubt over the question whether the President has statutory authority to invoke Federal primacy
165

Id. at 42. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006), does not alter the above conclusion. In that case, the
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through the use of Federal troops to restore disorder caused by a natural disaster. As we have
shown immediately above,168 the Constitution almost certainly justifies that legislation in cases
of catastrophes overwhelming State and local governments. As was true of the statutory
situation, however, Congress could add clarity to the Constitutional questions by using the
Spending Clause to condition the substantial Federal aid afforded States during catastrophes on
the State turnover of response authority to the Federal government upon a Presidential finding of
State incapability.
In this regard, it is a high irony that the Nation’s Governors were so quick to oppose the
passage of the Warner Amendment, because these same Governors repeatedly call upon the
President to provide vast amounts of Federal aid and resources when confronted with serious
natural disasters. Indeed, Hurricane Katrina presented the President with the thirtieth occasion in
2005 where he was requested by the States under the Stafford Act to provide Federal financial
assistance and resources in response to major natural disasters.169
The Stafford Act authorizes the President to declare an emergency or major disaster at the
request of a State Governor and release Federal funds and assistance to the State for use in the
disaster response.170 The Stafford Act defines an “emergency” as “any occasion or instance for
which . . . Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities . . .
or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. . . .”171 A “major disaster” is defined as “any
natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal
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wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion.”172
Two types of assistance may be utilized if the President declares a major disaster:
general Federal assistance, which includes the use of Federal equipment, supplies, personnel, as
well as technical and advisory assistance; and essential assistance, which includes all assistance
needed to meet “immediate threats to life and property” resulting from the disaster, including use
of DOD resources.173 The Governor of the State in which the disaster occurred may also request
the use of DOD resources, and the President may grant the request if use of DOD resources for
emergency work is essential to preserving life and property.174 The “emergency work” DOD
may perform is limited to “clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and temporary
restoration of essential public facilities and services.”175 While the Federal government may
offer technical advice to States and localities regarding disaster management, the statute does not
now grant the Federal government primary control of the response coordination.176
The provisions of the Stafford Act, as they now exist, predicate Federal assistance upon a
State’s request for aid and the State’s inherent recognition that the required response exceeds its
own resources. If, however, a State is overwhelmed, even after Federal assistance is given, but
unwilling to relinquish control of the response effort, leading to a breakdown of government
services, the Federal government faces a scenario (as it did in Katrina) where it is arguably
precluded from controlling the response even when presented with the possibility of unmitigated
human suffering. Amending the Stafford Act and conditioning a State’s acceptance of Stafford
Act funds upon Federal takeover of the response where the President finds the State unable to
172
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respond to the disaster emphatically resolves this potential problem and makes the Constitutional
defense of the Federal actions considerably easier.
South Dakota v. Dole177 is the lead case here. In that case, a Federal statute authorized
the Secretary of Transportation to withhold certain Federal highway funds from States unwilling
to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one.178 The Court sustained the statute as a valid
exercise of the spending power by outlining a four-part test for determining a condition’s
Constitutionality. The condition had to:1) be stated clearly; 2) serve the general welfare; 3) be
reasonably related to the purpose for which the Federal funds have been allocated; and 4) not
induce the States to violate an independent Constitutional bar.179
The proposed amendment to the Stafford Act would certainly comply with the first three
criteria. The provision could unambiguously condition the receipt of funds upon a Federal
takeover of the response in situations where the President determined that the State was
overwhelmed and unable to make effective use of the Federal resources; the condition would not
only serve the general welfare, but would be created solely for that purpose; and the condition
would clearly relate to the purpose for which the Federal funds were allocated: effective disaster
response designed to save lives and property, and reduce human suffering.
The fourth condition is slightly more complicated in that the Tenth Amendment could
present a limitation on Congressional interference with State affairs.180 As mentioned earlier, all
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fifty Governors opposed the Warner Amendment, as an unnecessary interference with the States’
Police Powers.181
South Dakota v. Dole addressed any ostensible Tenth Amendment limitation by finding
there that the State was free to disregard the condition by refusing Federal funds.182 However,
the Court did recognize that a “financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as
to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”183
A condition on Stafford Act assistance should not be viewed as coercive, despite the
backdrop of a major disaster. First, States have the option of gaining disaster assistance in
accordance with numerous inter-jurisdictional mutual aid agreements such as the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (“EMAC”), under which 20,000 civilian and 46,500 National
Guard personnel were deployed to the Gulf Coast region to respond to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.184 Resources exist outside of Stafford Act assistance, and therefore a condition on Stafford
Act funds would not constitute economic coercion because the Federal government does not
monopolize emergency response resources. Second, and even more telling, the condition upon
which assistance would be based would only be activated if the President finds a State is
completely unable to respond to the disaster. In that situation, it is hardly coercion to allow the
Federal government to predicate the dispersal of its own substantial funds and resources,
including military personnel, on its takeover of the response, because the State is not being
compelled to acquiesce involuntarily, rather, it is incapable of acting altogether. Unlike
imposing an affirmative obligation upon the State, e.g., conditioning Federal funds on a State
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establishing radioactive waste disposal sites,185 the Federal government is merely giving the
State the option to accept Federal assistance contingent upon Federal control of the response
during a catastrophe so large that traditional State and local disaster management mechanisms
are rendered useless.
The Stafford Act is a critical part of Federal emergency management, and amending it in
this way would clarify the Federal infrastructure for disaster response and mitigate damage and
human suffering by allowing a Federal takeover of the response in a situation as dire as the one
presented during the Gulf Coast hurricanes.

Conclusion
The recent passage of the Warner Amendment creates a bright line for determining the
appropriate use of Federal troops during major domestic natural disasters. The amendment
clarifies that, under extreme circumstances when local and State governments are overwhelmed
by response efforts to a catastrophic natural disaster, the Federal government may use and stay in
charge of Federal troops to restore public order. Although this power was widely recognized to
pre-date the amendment, the confusion surrounding the law resulted in delays and inaction
during Hurricane Katrina that may have cost many lives and imposed great suffering on those
who survived.
Similarly, the collective force of the Insurrection, Guarantee, Commerce, and Necessary
and Proper Clauses should provide an adequate Constitutional underpinning for the Warner
Amendment as applied to a major catastrophe that disables State and local response mechanisms.
Congress could remove all Constitutional doubt, however, by conditioning the receipt of major
disaster Federal aid under the Stafford Act on the right of the Federal government to control the
185
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response, if and only if, the President determines that, even with Federal assistance, the disaster
has overwhelmed the capabilities of the affected State and local governments.
At the close of this article, it is also worth stressing once again certain fundamental
practicalities that would doubtless govern questions of legality in these instances. First, in most
instances, not only are the States and localities fully capable of leading an effective response
with supplemental assistance provided by the Federal government, but that is the way in which
the Federal government would vastly prefer these responses be handled. Even leaving aside the
fact that so many Federal resources are now deployed abroad in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Federal government, in the best of circumstances, does not have the assets and funding to take
charge of every serious natural disaster occurring within the United States. Second, with adroit
Federal supervision, the issue of “who is in charge” need never be formally addressed. If the
Federal government acts in accordance with its own National Response Plan, a unified command
structure involving all relevant officials at every level of government communicating on a
constant and real time basis should encourage collaboration and cooperation and remove the
need for declarations of primacy.186 Third, even when the worst case scenario must be
confronted, as was the case in Katrina, it defies all logic that the Federal courts would not
squarely support actions that avoid the kind of wide scale human suffering, loss of property, and
displacement that occurred, and is now occurring, in New Orleans. Katrina-like situations are
the one occurrence where a President who acts decisively and unilaterally will win the
widespread approval of the American people and the Federal courts.
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